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Spectacular Narratives: Twister, Independence Day, and 
frontier mythology in contemporary Hollywood 
 
By Geoff King  
 
Big-screen spectacle has become increasingly important to Hollywood in 
recent decades. It formed a central part of a post-war strategy aimed at 
tempting lost audiences back to the cinema in the face of demographic 
changes and the development of television and other domestic leisure 
activities. More recently, in an age in which the big Hollywood studios 
have become parts of giant conglomerates, the prevalence of spectacle 
and special effects has been boosted by a demand to engineer products 
that can be further exploited in multimedia forms such as computer 
games and theme-park rides, secondary outlets that can sometimes 
generate more profits than the films on which they are based. These and 
other developments have led some commentators to announce, or 
predict, the imminent demise of narrative as a central component of 
Hollywood cinema. But the case has been considerably overstated. 
Narrative is far from being eclipsed, even in the most spectacular and 
effects-oriented of today‟s blockbuster attractions. These films still tend to 
tell reasonably coherent stories, even if they may sometimes be looser 
and less well integrated than classical models. More important for my 
argument, contemporary spectaculars also continue to manifest the kinds 
of underlying thematic oppositions and reconciliations associated with a 
broadly „structuralist‟ analysis of narrative. This very important dimension 
of narrative has been largely ignored by those who identify, celebrate or 
more often bemoan a weakening of plot or character development in 
many spectacular features.  
 
Strong evidence for the continued existence of such underlying 
narrative structures is found in the continued saliency of elements of the 
myth or ideology of the American frontier to many contemporary 
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Hollywood films. Arguably the archetypal American narrative, the myth of 
the frontier offers a series of thematic oppositions that continue to 
underpin films, or even entire genres, whatever the state of their surface 
plots. The traditional generic Western may be in a state of near-terminal 
decline, but the mythic or ideological narrative that animated it remains 
alive and well in Hollywood. Focusing on two of the summer blockbusters 
of 1996, Twister and Independence Day, this paper will aim to 
demonstrate the part it plays in structuring many films, particularly in 
terms of an opposition between the „frontier‟ or its contemporary 
analogues and a version of technological modernity. 
 
To assert the importance of narrative structures such as these 
need not be to disregard the role of spectacle. Narrative and spectacle 
can work together in a variety of changing relationships and there is no 
single, all-embracing answer to the question of how the two are related. 
One of the reasons for the hasty dismissal of the importance of narrative 
in contemporary Hollywood may be the overstatement by influential 
theorists such as David Bordwell of the degree of its coherence in, and 
dominance of, the „classical‟ Hollywood of the studio era. Narrative 
coherence was important to „classical‟ Hollywood, but only as one of a 
number of competing dynamics. Other attractions such as distracting 
star performances or other spectacles might be thrown in at almost any 
time.1 The connotations of the term „classical‟ are part of the problem, 
including as it does in Bordwell‟s account an emphasis on „decorum, 
proportion, formal harmony‟ (4) characteristics that were not always 
given priority. Numerous commentators on contemporary, „New‟ or „post-
classical‟ Hollywood seem to rely at least in part on such implicit 
assumptions about the cinema that went before.2 The point is not to doubt 
that there have been changes in the precise relations between narrative 
and spectacle from one period to another, but to question any suggestion 
that there was a point of departure at which „classical‟ narrative existed in 
anything like a „pure‟ state, uncontaminated by various kinds of evasions 
and distractions. From the very start, throughout the „classical‟ era, and 
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today, narrative and spectacle have existed in a series of shifting 
relationships in which neither has ever been entirely absent. And the 
relative absence of coherent plot or character development in some 
effects-led productions today does not entail an evacuation of underlying 
narrative themes and oppositions of a structural kind. 
 
Spectacle may disrupt narrative. Spectacular elements that seem 
to exist purely for their own sake, rather than being integrated into the film 
as a whole, may take on the character of „cinematic excess‟, as Kristin 
Thompson puts it. But this view, again, is premised on an assumption, 
drawn in this instance from the work of Stephen Heath, that the mission 
of cinema is to produce homogeneity. If some of the products of Classical 
Hollywood do seem unified, balanced, coherent and „well-made‟, it is 
doubtful that this was ever an overriding imperative. Profitability has 
usually been more important than unity or homogeneity. The desire to 
appeal to a mass market is as likely to result in a degree of built-in 
incoherence and conflicting demands. Spectacle is often just as much a 
core aspect of Hollywood cinema as coherent narrative and should not 
necessarily be seen as a disruptive intrusion from some place outside. 
The coherence or drive towards coherence often ascribed to classical 
Hollywood films can be a product of a particular kind of critical reading 
rather than a quality of the text itself. 
 
In some cases, including Twister and Independence Day, 
spectacle can be seen to reinforce as much as to interfere with the work 
of narrative. Moments of spectacle are often associated with the moving 
forward of narrative considered in terms of plot development. They can 
also play an important part in the play of underlying narrative structures. 
In terms of narrative themes, I will be arguing, the frontier is offered as a 
spectacular intrusion into (or escape from) everyday life. Many 
contemporary Hollywood productions can also be understood as 
promising a kind of surrogate „frontier‟ experience for the viewer at the 
level of audio-visual spectacle. The films themselves are presented as 
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spectacular intrusions into the daily life of the viewer. Hollywood 
spectacle is offered as an alternative to the domestic routine. It 
claims however dubiously or paradoxically to impinge directly on the 
spectator, to offer an authentic experience, filled with a vivid sense of 
large scale presence, that is contrasted to both everyday life and 
domestic media such as television. The spectacular experience offered to 
the viewer is in a sense presented as a vicarious equivalent of the frontier 
experience celebrated thematically at the level of narrative. 
 
 These issues need to be interrogated at a number of levels. This 
paper will begin by considering at some length the thematic oppositions 
that underpin the texts, situating them in their mythological, ideological 
and political contexts. Twister and Independence Day will also be 
considered within the industrial and aesthetic contexts of Hollywood in the 
so-called „post-studio‟ era (something of a misnomer, given the continued 
dominance of the Hollywood majors). This will require an examination of 
the contemporary social and cultural position of Hollywood cinema and its 
formal strategies, particularly the relationship between narrative and 
spectacle. Consideration will also be given to the place contemporary 





Narrative oppositions and resolutions: frontier zone vs. 
technological modernity 
 
The hero of Twister (1996) sniffs the air, picks up a handful of dirt 
and lets it fall slowly through his fingers before looking up into the sky, 
instinctively reading the natural signs that tell him when and where a 
tornado is brewing. His arch-rival has little time for such niceties, relying 
not on his own senses but on vanloads of expensive computerized 
technology paid for by corporate funds. The hero Bill Harding (Bill 
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Paxton), in his jeans, is marked clearly as heir to the frontier tradition. His 
opponent Jonas Miller (Cary Elwes), in vaguely military-looking cap and 
fatigues, is a representative of corporate-sector technological might and 
accorded a far less sympathetic hearing. Twister‟s engagement with 
these terms appears to be simplistic and entirely in favour of frontier 
nostalgia. The dramatic clash between the central characters is loaded, to 
an almost comic-book extent. Harding is the good-guy, Miller the bad, 
and their personal fates are predetermined accordingly. The underlying 
issues, however, are not so easily contained and certain ambiguities 
remain, both in the film and the broader cultural context. A distinction 
needs to be made here between value judgements about the quality of 
„surface‟ narrative found in this kind of film usually declared wanting in 
terms of complexity and subtlety, particularly when measured against 
critically more favoured Hollywood products such as those associated 
with the „Hollywood Renaissance‟ of the late 1960s and early 1970s and 
the importance of underlying narrative structures that might be engaged 
in a more subtle process of narrative, cultural, mythic or ideological work.  
A similar structure of oppositions is implicit in Independence Day the 
other big effects-led blockbuster of the summer of 1996 in which alien 
attack provides the catalyst for the juxtaposition of frontier and 
technological realms. The fact that these themes continue to underpin 
such popular films underlines their centrality to the strains within 
American mythology in the last decade of the twentieth century and 
demonstrates an essential continuity in the underlying narrative 
preoccupations of many products of contemporary Hollywood, however 
overblown the spectacular dimension might have become. 
 
 
 Elemental force in Twister and Independence Day is presented as 
both lethal danger and potential source of redemption, precisely the role 
played by the wilderness and its occupants in the classic American 
frontier tradition. To those lacking the requisite knowledge and attitude, 
the wild—manifested by prodigious tornado or alien—is a hazardous 
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enemy to be tamed or destroyed. But to certain privileged individuals it 
offers the possibility of a special kind of supposedly authentic experience. 
This is offered as valuable both in itself and as providing a more widely 
applicable cure to a range of social ills. The frontier also becomes a 
domain in which such individuals can make a difference, where 
immediate human agency is freed from social constraint. 
 
 Chasing the tornados of Twister offers an opportunity for 
excitement, adventure and an engagement with undomesticated natural 
extremity. The space within and immediately around the tornado 
becomes a mobile frontier zone in which such possibilities are unleashed 
amid otherwise mundane existence. The heart of the tornado is a place of 
carnivalized disruption. Normal rules do not apply. The frontier is often 
seen as a place where the usual weight of social norms is lessened or 
removed. Within the force-fields of the tornado the metaphor is literalized. 
The laws of gravity are rescinded, at least temporarily. Heavy vehicles 
and entire buildings are freed from their bounds. The result is chaotic and 
hazardous, but also liberating and exhilarating. Harding and his partner 
Jo (Helen Hunt) are portrayed as characters who have what it takes to 
inhabit this privileged space, to get close enough even to penetrate to the 
heart of the tornado, and to survive the experience. Miller remains 
alienated from such possibility. His dependence on technology leads him 
astray. He usually misses the target and his one direct engagement with 
the tornado leads to his death.  
 
 Engagement with the alien invaders of Independence Day offers 
similar possibility of escape from the mess, tedium and corruption of daily 
life in late-twentieth-century America it is into such terms, avoiding any 
real or more substantial causal factors, that the fruits of contemporary 
capitalism tend to be rendered. Abandoning the metropolis for a 
showdown launched from the New Mexico desert, the central characters 
move from an alienated state to a form of elemental combat that enables 
them to prove themselves in a complete break from dull or oppressive 
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routine. The frontier experience produces the appearance of enemies that 
are unambiguously defined and against which a clear definition of 
virtuous self can be articulated. The contrast between desert and 
cityscape is starkly drawn in Independence Day, the original westward 
frontier movement echoed in the image of  a caravan of motor-homes 
moving across the empty expanses of Nevada. The personification of 
wilderness force seems particularly to relish assaults on what might be 
seen as decadent forms of entertainment, such as the tornado bringing 
real terror to the drive-in performance of The Shining (1980) in Twister, in 
a pattern of retributive violence that echoes Puritan strictures on the 
dangers of moral „backsliding.‟ The point is made more generally and 
forcefully in Independence Day when the aliens destroy the heart of the 
metropolis, bringing fiery vengeance like some latter-day Old Testament 
god. The fact that one of these films is set on the date celebrated for the 
signing of the Declaration of Independence reinforces the potential of 
their events both to question and to provide opportunity to 
revive hallowed American values. Shadows are cast, literally, on 
Washington‟s monumental embodiments of these values in 
Independence Day, metaphorically to be lifted in the victorious climax. 
The foolish attempt to engage tornado or alien spacecraft without 
adequate protection, preparation, or knowledge. The heroes are qualified 
to move into the frontier territory, to take on the deadly force.  
 
 These  films imply that the frontier experience offers more than just 
hedonistic thrills for the individuals involved. There is also the possibility 
of redemption, at both the individual and social levels. The terms of 
redemption in Twister are crude and simplistic. Harding rejoins his old 
tornado-chasing team at the moment that he is about to end his marriage 
to Jo, who is rhetorically asserted to be the „right woman‟ for him, 
however much they argue. He is engaged instead to marry Melissa (Jami 
Gertz), a sex-therapist cheaply caricatured as incompetent on the frontier 
terrain, a whining metropolitan creature tied permanently by mobile phone 
to the sexual inadequacies of life in the city. It goes without saying that 
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the return to tornado-frontier experience brings Harding back to his 
senses and the renewal of his relationship with Jo, with whom he can 
share the straightforward and conventional heterosexual passions of a 
literal whirlwind romance—the sequences in which they experience the 
inside of the tornado together have an increasingly orgasmic quality—in 
which he remains for the most part the dominant patriarchal figure. The 
worthy social agenda is provided by a plot mechanism in which the aim of 
the enterprise is to release into the tornado a recording device capable of 
giving new information to help in the future plotting and prediction of 
tornado outbreaks.  
 
 Twister also implies that the personal redemption gained by 
Harding is more generally available to those who regulate their lives 
according to an honest and instinctive rhythm, redolent of what the 
frontier stands for in the mythology, rather than becoming mired in the 
„decadent‟ tendencies of life in the metropolis. His new life with Jo, we are 
led to assume, will be a healthy and wholesome relationship, sharing the 
open and hospitable values signified by scenes at the home of Jo‟s 
eccentric but adored Aunt Meg (Lois Smith) and the pastoral landscape in 
which the couple are left at the film‟s conclusion after the final tornado 
has passed. The tornado leaves a rambling old farmhouse homestead 
miraculously intact in its path, an enormously resonant and compacted 
symbol of the kind of lifestyle they will presumably adopt.3 Their domestic 
future is prefigured in the image of a farming couple and their three young 
children emerging unscathed from an underground storm shelter, a 
sequence whose significance is emphasized by its placement before we 
are shown the dishevelled figures of the two principal survivors. The 
redemption offered by the displaced frontier is a celebration of the nuclear 
family, particularly the restoration of the father-figure so dramatically 
plucked from the scene in the prologue, in which Jo as a young girl saw 
her father carried to his death by a giant tornado. Twister starts and 
finishes with a family group seeking shelter from the ultimate „force five‟ 
tornado—which appears nowhere else in the film. In the first case, the 
father dies. In the second, the family survives intact and the potential of a 
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new family is restored. In the elliptical logic so typical of Hollywood 
cinema, the future fruits of the successful tornado-monitoring experiment 
are reaped immediately, by implication, in the emotional pay-off delivered 
by this re-writing of the tragic prologue. Miller is left dead, and along with 
him, it seems, the underlying threat posed by the identification between 
his character and the anonymous corporate forces for which he stands 
and which have so often been counterposed to the supposedly true 
American values of the frontier. This theme is not greatly elaborated but 
does not need to be: the broad implications are implicit and sufficiently 
familiar in American mythology to stand as shorthand for a whole complex 
of negative associations. Any more substantial analysis of the relations 
between corporate capitalism and the realities of daily life in America is 
neatly short-circuited. 
 
 Individual redemption is offered to the leading characters of 
Independence Day. The reluctant genius David Levinson (Jeff Goldblum) 
is freed from meaningless work for a cable television company, enabled 
instead to put his intellect to the ultimate in worthwhile ends—saving the 
world. President Thomas Whitmore (Bill Pullman), a former Gulf War 
fighter pilot, abandons the manipulations of electoral politics to lead a 
global fight-back and, eventually, takes to the skies himself in the final 
conflict. Captain Steven Hiller (Will Smith), a black USAF pilot turned 
down by NASA—presumably on the grounds of his colour, given the 
displays we are given of his prowess—manages to fly a captured alien 
craft to deliver the crucial blow, while Vietnam veteran Russell Casse 
(Randy Quaid) recovers from alcoholic haze to die in redemptive 
kamikaze glory. The crisis also leads to revived romance between 
Levinson and his ex-wife and impels Hiller and his girlfriend to cement 
their affair in marriage. For all its transgressive potential, the frontier 
remains in Hollywood a place more often for the restoration of sexual 
conformity. On the broader canvas, redemption comes not just in the 
saving of the world but through the global unity demonstrated by a world 
shaking off petty quarrels to come together against the threat of 
annihilation. At the political level, the President is able to regain power 
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from conspiratorial federal forces that have concealed the truth about 
alien remains recovered in the notorious Roswell incident of the 1950s, 
one of the icons of contemporary American domestic paranoia. 
 
 Key elements of frontier mythology are central, then, to the 
dynamics of Twister and Independence Day. Underlying the 
confrontations enacted  by these films is an opposition between two of 
the most powerful components of dominant American ideology: the myth 
of the frontier and the alternative myth of technological modernity, 
according to which America is taken as a model of modernizing progress, 
whether industrial or post-industrial. The two mythologies are in some 
respects mutually exclusive. More significant, perhaps, for its ideological 
resonance in contemporary American culture, is the extent to which the 
contradictions between the two can be resolved, or at least displaced. 
This was a central mythic function of the traditional generic Western. 
Advanced technology is associated with areas of culture—as opposed to 
the „nature‟ experienced on the frontier—which at the very least shade 
dangerously into corruption and decadence. Technology also has a 
positive role to play, however, as might be expected of a culture in which 
the imperatives of the frontier have always existed in a state of tension 
with celebrations of modernity and progress. From early colonial times to 
the present, America has often been seen as a place of enlightenment, of 
new beginnings freed from the inheritances of old cultural baggage and 
superstitions. In certain manifestations this outlook is entirely consistent 
with frontier mythology, particularly conceptions of the frontier as a place 
of fresh starts, new worlds and escape from the past. If the frontier is 
viewed as something that played an essential part in the development of 
a distinctive „American Way‟ but that had to pass with the coming of a 
new „civilization‟, then there is no fundamental contradiction: the frontier 
experience might be seen as having cleared the way for the 
establishment of a society founded on the enlightened use of technology, 
for the benefit of all rather than that of encrusted privilege. 
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 Nostalgia for the „lost‟ frontier often takes a stronger form, 
however,  in which the rosy glow of past reflection is outshone by the 
desire actively (and often violently) to re-create something of the frontier 
experience in modern life, if only as a substitute for the reality whose 
existence in the terms promoted by the myth was always in doubt. The 
tension is manifested at the end of Twister in the form of the competing 
imperatives represented by pastoral landscape—civilized, not wilderness 
but not decadent either—and frontier vortex. The dangers of the frontier 
have to be tamed if the pastoral idyll is to be secured. But the continued 
proximity or possibility of the frontier remains necessary if the pastoral is 
to maintain its ideal middle position, between two poles, and not to be left 
open only to the corrupting sway of the metropolis.4 The freedom and 
vitality of the „wind‟ is reconciled with the solidity and settled existence of 
the „earth‟. That this is all rooted in myth—the shape of the „original‟ 
American frontier often having been structured and organized by events 
in the metropolis rather than being in any way primal or originary5—does 
little to reduce its ideological impact. 
 
 The problem identified by the main narrative movement of Twister 
is not the use of technology itself but an excessive reliance upon 
technology. Miller goes to his death as a consequence of his arrogant 
refusal to take advice from Harding, whose instinctive feel for the 
movements of tornados has on several occasions been shown to be 
superior to Miller‟s technological and military-style operation. „The days of 
sniffing the dirt are over,‟ Miller asserts, although it is made clear that 
even Miller knows, really, that he is wrong and that Harding‟s instincts are 
reliable. It is through sheer arrogance and disavowal, in the end, that he 
is driven to ignore any signals other than those coming from the banks of 
technology and is led to his doom. Harding‟s team also uses 
computerized technology to track the tornados, but it is kept in its place. 
This is underlined by the fact that it is not Harding himself but other 
members of the team who are glued to their electronic monitors. Harding 
prefers to keep his senses alerted to the real world, unmediated. 
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Technology is important, but not transcendent. It is also subject to the 
kind of hands-on improvisation associated with frontier life, where 
pioneers are supposed to do everything for themselves, to be directly 
involved in all aspects of life, rather than the narrow specialization of 
technocratic society (how closely any of this accords with the harsh 
rigours of manual labour on the frontier remains questionable). The 
device that is to be released into the tornado is presented with the full 
cinematic rhetoric of „masterful technology‟, floods of what is assumed to 
be „vital data‟ filling computer screens as it flies into action. It is unlikely to 
work at all, however, until modified in a moment of last-minute inspiration 
in which fragments of Pepsi cans are used to construct makeshift wings 
(Jo requests the collection of „every aluminium can you can find‟, but only 
Pepsi seems to exist). Product placement here becomes a source of 
salvation, the ultimate in positive-vibe positioning for the product involved. 
Pepsi glitters in the limelight for significant moments, but the placement is 
firmly integrated into central narrative themes of the movie. It does not 
„work against‟ the narrative, the impact of product placement suggested 
by Mark Crispin Miller, but gains its resonance precisely from the extent 
to which it is positioned at a narrative crux. If the wilderness itself is 
figured sexually as feminine, the dominant trope in a range of American 
cultural products, Twister proffers its own vivid image in the shape of the 
vaginal vortex of the tornado, at once hazardous and fascinating, 
seething and—initially, at least—unknowable. The phallic imagery is also 
unmistakable, the device ejaculating a multitude of sperm-like silver balls 
that penetrate to the centre of the tornado. The tornado becomes 
knowable, predictable and at least partially domesticated. As does Jo, 
whose leadership role in the tornado-chasing team is often supplanted by 
Harding‟s return and whose more obsessive attitude toward the 
tornado however much rationalized by her childhood 
experience seems to associate her with its irrationality. 
 
 The most insistent visual signal of the contrasting approaches of 
the Harding and Miller teams in Twister are the convoys of vehicles in 
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which they chase across the countryside. The villains occupy an almost 
obligatory fleet of anonymous and sinister black vans, signifying the evil 
forces of centralized regimentation. The good guys are in a motley 
collection including a battered old motor-home—that modern version of 
the covered wagon, again—blaring out rock music and generally 
emanating a spirit of eccentric pioneer individuality.  
 
 Despite the simplistic mechanics of the character-oppositions, 
Twister offers some resolution of the competing demands of frontier and 
technology, although frontier values remain privileged. A similar dynamic 
is found in Independence Day, in which technology is presented as 
necessary to survival, but again far from sufficient. A high state of 
technological readiness is necessary if the aliens are to be defeated, a 
point that is clearly central to the film‟s conservative and militaristic stand. 
As in War of the Worlds (1953), on which the film is partly based, and 
many other science fictions, it is made quite clear that the aliens are 
creatures as feeble physiologically as humans and are daunting enemies 
only by virtue of technological might. But technology-as-system,  purely 
as part of a giant military-industrial complex, does not work. The full might 
of jet fighters and nuclear weapons fails initially to make any dent in the 
alien armour.  To break through, the film suggests, something more 
quirky, human and inventive is required; namely, the computer virus 
introduced by the maverick genius of David Levinson with a little 
inspirational help from his father Julius (Judd Hirsch), plus the 
unconventional aerobatics of Hiller and Casse and the leadership 
qualities of Whitmore. The jet pilot is privileged (as most obviously 
elsewhere in Top Gun (1986)) as a figure able to maintain heroic qualities 
of active agency, in control of—rather than determined by—his 
technology. The heroic elements essential to success are divided here 
among several characters. Levinson is hardly a traditional frontiersman, 
but he is a character of environmentalist credentials, hostile to the 
wasteful ways of modern technological existence. Hiller, Casse and 
Whitmore (especially once the latter exchanges presidential robes for 
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fighter-pilot outfit) have more conventional frontier traits, as transplanted 
into the domain of aerial warfare.  
  
 A dynamic of progress is ultimately endorsed, as in the classic 
Western narrative in which the frontier, however much sanctified and 
privileged, is usually viewed as a state that has to pass with the inevitable 
coming of modern „civilization‟. This is the impression given by the closing 
images of heterosexual bliss and pastoral tranquillity in Twister, the point 
at which the tornado-wilderness is about to come under greater control. If 
one of the frontier-types has to be sacrificed in Independence Day it is not 
surprising that it is Casse, a relatively marginal figure and not accidentally 
the one associated with the traumatic Vietnam war rather than the 
overwhelming success of high-tech weaponry in the Persian Gulf. The 
audience is left with the impression that sometimes initially reluctant 
saviours remain available to come to the rescue should the occasion be 
repeated. The final effect is equivocal, seeking to square the values of 
frontier nostalgia with the hope for future progress—an ambivalence that 
has always been present in frontier mythology. The function of popular 
mythology, expertly achieved by many Hollywood films, is precisely to 
effect such reconciliations, however contradictory their components  
might appear on closer examination. Resolution is provided on an 
imaginary level for oppositions that cannot be overcome in reality. Issues 
that raise substantial difficulties for a particular culture—as the inherent 
contradictions of frontier discourse and modernity do for America—are 
displaced onto a  plane where mythic sleight of hand can offer at least a 
semblance of reconcilation. 
 
Independence Day is more crude and specific—and ideologically 
loaded—in its points of reference. Independence Day is voracious in its 
effort to gobble up everything around it in a broad inclusiveness of 
reference of which Steven Spielberg is a principal target. The film makes 
explicit and implicit reference to the mushy liberalism of Close Encounters 
of the Third Kind (1977). A hippyish group of individuals gather on the 
roof of a skyscraper hoping for some kind of loving communion with the 
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aliens—and promptly get vaporized, as does a helicopter sent up to 
communicate by playing music and flashing coloured lights. The denizens 
of the rooftop are presented as a fake, metropolitan and decadent version 
of the kind of redemption that is only really available to those strong 
enough to engage more violently with the alien. The entire sentimental 
project of Close Encounters is dismissed as firmly here as in the direct 
reference, in which Hiller punches out a crash-landed alien, quipping 
„Now that‟s what I call a Close Encounter.‟ The joke is guaranteed a 
laugh, but the politics is more serious in a film which presents the being 
from another world as a cold, absolutely alien „Other‟ for whom all 
humanity can usefully do is „die‟. This justifies a response of unmitigated 
violence on the American part that is central to the film‟s reactionary 
politics.  
 
 The evil alien of science fiction that once stood potentially as a 
metaphor for the Soviet Union is revived in the post Cold War era as its 
ideologically much-required replacement—the Other against which 
internal unity can be asserted. Complicating factors are removed at a 
stroke. The effect is much the same as the dismissal of conspiracy theory 
to which I referred earlier. If one gesture removes the obligations denoted 
by the benevolent aliens of Spielberg, the other unwinds the 
entanglements—of form and narrative—woven by the conspiracy-movie 
subgenre of the Vietnam/Watergate-infected early 1970s. Conspiracy 
theory is taken on board but only to be disavowed. The threats of both 
sentimentality and corruption are shuffled off. A nod to the HAL computer 
of 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968)—its sinister red eye and a „Good 
Morning, Dave‟ greet Levinson on his computer when he enters the alien 
spacecraft for the climactic engagement—seems sufficient to dismiss the 
burden of Kubrick‟s tale of the eclipse of  human agency by technology.  
The film embraces ethnic and racial diversity among the central 
characters, disavowing the existence of internal ruptures along these 
lines. What is left is a reassuringly simple, binary opposition between 
Good and Evil, unitary collective Self and absolute Other. The cleansing 
of American society and the darkening of the Other permit a return to the 
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terms of the pre-revisionist Western—and the Cold War— at their most 
ideologically pure, and a realm in which there is no question other than to 
kill the alien-Other or be killed. 
 
The version of  frontier and technology given in Twister and 
Independence Day is more unambiguously celebratory than that found in 
many earlier explorations of the same mythological landscape. A good 
point of comparison might be Jaws (1975), which negotiates similar 
oppositions in a more tentative and questioning manner, befitting an era 
in which the confident assertions of frontier mythology were confronted by 
the immediate fallout of the Vietnam war and other social and economic 
upheavals in the United States of the early-to-mid 1970s. The greater 
stridency of films like Twister and Independence Day can be seen at 
some level as part of a concerted effort in the past 25 years to rehabilitate 
the myth of the frontier. Frontier rhetoric was mobilized widely during the 
Vietnam war, but as also seriously damaged by is association with 
Vietnam. The post-Vietnam era has seen numerous efforts to reassert the 
myth, not the least being movies about the war and the boom in science 
fiction from the late 1970s.   
 
To suggest a project of rehabilitating frontier mythology in this 
period is not to assume any active conspiracy on the part of those who 
might benefit from its ideological impact. The mythic or ideological work 
carried out by appeals to the frontier is essentially pleasing and flattering 
to the audience. These films offer large measures of reassurance. They 
confront difficult issues, but in a superficial manner. Real underlying 
contradictions remain, but the rhetoric of movies such as Twister and 
Independence Day gives the impression of resolution. Issues are raised 
just far enough to open up the gap that can then quickly be filled. This 
might not always work perfectly, but in general it is likely to offer sufficient 
pleasure to most audiences for any explanation based on conspiracy 
theory to be superfluous. Hollywood‟s commitment to providing 
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pleasure its primary route to profit is itself enough to account a move 
towards the reassertion of frontier mythology.  
 
  Twister and Independence Day appeared at a time when frontier 
values again came up against some awkward realities, however, despite 
the generally conservative flavour of the political context. The antics of 
extreme anti-state right-wing militias and bombers have forced some 
Americans at least  to confront the darker side of the mythology of frontier 
violence, redemption and virulent suspicion of state and corporate power. 
By taking the logical implications of frontier mythology to their violent 
extremes, these groups have made elements of the mythology less 
comfortable in the hands of those situated at the more liberal end of the 
spectrum. They have also been greeted with applause in some circles, 
however, even if the means are often condemned. The fervent opposition 
to the heritage of industrialism and technology expressed by the 
Unabomber from his Walden-esque cabin in the Montana backwoods has 
wider resonances in contemporary American culture, as is suggested by 
the iconic adoption of his photofit image (the hooded figure in dark 
glasses) and by the suspicion of bureaucratic technological dependence 
expressed in these highly popular movies.  
  
 Both Twister and Independence Day play into a context in which 
they can indulge and offer fantastic resolution to reactionary paranoia 
about the secret machinations of state or corporate power. This right-wing 
version of the anti-state/corporate critique serves also to divert attention 
from what I would suggest are far more pertinent questions raised by the 
left, the alien-conspiracy version safely channelling such inquiry into the 
realms of fantasy. A film like Twister provides a legitimate and sanitized 
way of identifying with frontier experience, safely contained by the 
rationalization that it is all in the name of beneficent progress and that 
there are no  victims other than of accident or their own folly. Its setting 
unambiguously reasserts the mythical „heartland‟ resonance of an 
Oklahoma landscape that was so traumatized by the Oklahoma City 
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bombing—not to mention its gestures towards the fantasy of The Wizard 
of Oz (1939), whose Dorothy gives her name and homely tone to the 
makeshift technology used to monitor the tornado (it is notable that the 
bad-guy Miller version has become D.O.T., the coldly rational Digital 
Orthographic Telemeter rather than the warm and comforting Dorothy). 
Independence Day yokes the frontier theme to a barely disguised call for 
military retrenchment and an implicit celebration of the Gulf war that 
would not have looked out of place at the height of the Reagan era 
 
 None of the above should be taken to suggest that Hollywood films 
can be read unproblematically as simple reflectors of American culture, 
even when they attract large audiences. Hollywood cinema remains the 
product of highly specific industrial and institutional mediations. The 
popularity of any film can be shaped by relatively arbitrary factors such as 
promotional expenditure and the presence or absence of competition at 
the moment of release. Much of the work of distribution today is around 
the organization of this process. Such manipulations mean that we 
cannot read directly from the hit status of texts to argue that they plug 
immediately into contemporary cultural concerns.  
 
It would be equally implausible to suggest that there was no 
connection between movies that attract large audiences and wider 
cultural or ideological currents. Some kind of mediated relationship can 
be asserted, especially in cases such as popular genres or otherwise 
repeatedly successful frameworks. Successful genres are industrially and 
critically fabricated structures which—for all their mediations—seem to 
demonstrate a sustained popularity sufficient to enable us to speculate 
with some conviction about their connections to the level of mythology or 
ideology. It seems significant, for instance, that the conflicting imperatives 
of frontier and civilization that are repeatedly offered mythological 
resolution in the Western and the films examined here are also structured 
into seemingly very different settings such as the musical and numerous 
forms of Hollywood comedy.6 A threshold of ubiquity is reached at which 
stronger arguments can be made about the relations of such highly 
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mediated, industrial products to the broader cultural landscape in which 
they are situated, even if „scientific‟ standards of provable connection 
remain absent as they usually are in any debates about the „meaning‟ of 
cultural products.  
 
The mythic role of Hollywood may have been undermined to some 
extent in the postwar period. Genres such as the Western underwent an 
increasingly radical process of deconstruction and have been sustained in 
traditional form rather more in television than the cinema. Contemporary 
blockbusters seem to have regained some of this ground, however, re-
establishing mythic oppositions in the narrative, attracting huge audiences 
and achieving the resonance of broader cultural events. Social changes 
dating back to the 1950s have made the cinema audience more 
specialized and far less general in character. Much of the traditional mass 
audience was lost in the postwar consumer boom, the move to the 
suburbs and the rapid expansion of other forms of leisure activity, 
including television. What was left, or reconstructed, was a more 
segmented audience with a range of more specific demands: the „youth‟ 
audience, for example, or those seeking more „adult‟ and challenging 
fare. The blockbuster strategy is based precisely on seeking to mobilize a 
more general audience, akin to the mythic „family‟ audience at which 
Hollywood aimed its movies for decades during the „classical‟ era from 
the 1920s until the late 1940s. Cultural resonances which might tap into 
the concerns of potential moviegoers are taken explicitly into account by 
market researchers employed by Hollywood.7 Advertising and 
promotional strategies are often based around attempts to sell these 
movies as special events that have to be seen, that everybody is going 
to; to miss them, therefore, is to miss out, not to be included, just as many 
consumer products are advertised on their basis of creating consumption 
communities of one kind or another.  




 Closures at the formal and narrative levels play an important part 
in the assertion of imaginary reconciliations in Twister and Independence 
Day. In this sense, they fit into the broad category of what have become 
known as  „classical Hollywood‟ texts: tightly plotted cause-and-effect 
narratives that leave little room for questioning or doubts that might 
undermine the mythic resolution. They go out of their way to offer 
closures in the formal, narrative and ideological dimensions. Strong 
identifications are provided with hero-figures who carry us through the 
narrative and across any fissures. Our confidence in the abilities of the 
hero of Twister is absolute, whatever setbacks might be faced. Questions 
and uncertainties are evoked by some of the central characters in 
Independence Day, but only in order to highlight the absolute nature of 
the final triumph. Formal closures at the level of mise-en-scene and 
editing are more or less absolute, tightly „suturing‟ the viewer into driving, 
linear narratives which offer big emotional pay-offs as reward.  
 
 The mythic/ideological assertions of these films demonstrate that 
narrative is far from being surrendered to spectacle in even the more 
spectacular aspects of contemporary Hollywood. Yet these films do 
function importantly as spectacle. They trade heavily on the appeal of 
ever more grand special-effects sequences that sometimes seem 
motivated by little more than their own spectacular presence and box-
office appeal. Sitting back and simply „taking in‟ the spectacle, the impact 
of „big‟ special effects, seems to be as important a source of pleasure in 
these films as the joys of narrative perhaps more so, or at least more 
obviously so. According to one view, the history of cinema American 
cinema in particular, but also cinema more generally can be seen in 
terms of a gradual move from spectacle to narrative. Early cinema, 
around the turn of the century, is characterized in Tom Gunning‟s 
influential account as a „cinema of attractions‟, its appeal based on the 
direct confrontation and stimulation of viewers rather than their integration 
or passive absorption into sustained narratives. A variety of attractions 
were displayed on the screen, presented as objects of wonder to be 
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looked at for their own sake, rather than only for their value as elements 
in an ongoing narrative. By the 1910s at the latest, narrative became 
increasingly important, for a variety of commercial and aesthetic reasons 
around which debate continues.8 For some commentators, classical 
Hollywood cinema came to be defined by the centrality of linear 
narratives, to which all other elements are subordinated. An element of 
narrative was never entirely absent, however; not even from the earliest 
Lumiere „actualities‟ before the turn of the century. And, as Gunning 
suggests, attractions retained their place even when narrative became 
more sustained and central to the experience. He cites the particular 
cases of genres such as comedy and the musical. The question is 
whether spectacular disruptions are merely localized, generically 
motivated or pulled into line by the melodramatics of plot or whether 
they are more central to the dynamics of Hollywood cinema. Moments of 
spectacle or „excess‟ can be seen as intruding into an essentially 
coherent narrative fabric, a phenomenon often celebrated for what might 
then appear to be its radical potential. But the fabric may itself be a close 
weave of both narrative and spectacle.  
 
  The latter certainly seems to be the experience provided by films 
such as Twister and Independence Day. It may always have been the 
case in Hollywood. Any suggestion that narrative has largely been 
abandoned to spectacle seems a serious overstatement both of the 
alleged lack of spectacle in „classical‟ Hollywood and of the absence of 
narrative structure in the „post-classical‟ era. This is not to say that the 
situation is unchanged or unchanging. The balance between narrative 
and spectacle is dynamic and may shift from film to film or from one 
period to another. Good arguments can be made for emphasising one 
tendency or the other at particular moments. Spectacle tends to be 
foregrounded especially during periods of innovation such as the initial 
use of sound, colour or widescreen technology. The first sound films 
tended to be musicals; early colour and widescreen processes were 
associated with spectacle far more than realism. There is no shortage of 
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material grounding for suggesting the importance of spectacle in the 
specific case of Hollywood cinema in the latter part of the twentieth 
century. One of Hollywood‟s key strategies in response to the move of 
populations to the suburbs, and to competition from television and other 
forms of leisure activity, has been to use spectacular attraction as the 
basis of its effort to tempt audiences back into the cinema, playing on the 
particular characteristics of the big-screen experience. This phenomenon 
began in the 1950s and included experiments such as Cinerama and 3D, 
both of which originated outside the major studios. The development of 
CinemaScope by Twentieth Century-Fox (first used in the historical 
spectacle The Robe, 1953) marked the movement of spectacular new 
widescreen formats into the mainstream, where they proved popular and 
helped at least temporarily to stem the postwar loss of audiences.9 
Spectacular cinema underwent something of a decline in the later 1960s, 
as the studios ran into serious financial difficulties exacerbated by the 
failure of a few notorious spectacular features, but it returned as an 
increasingly dominant strategy through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  
 
And what has been offered by Hollywood spectacular in some 
cases is the promise of an experience claimed to have at least something 
in common with that conventionally associated with the frontier. Spectacle 
could be seen as the „moment‟ of the frontier offered directly to the 
viewer, visceral thrills that stand in for the frontier experience celebrated 
thematically in the narrative. The two levels—narrative and spectacle—
operate together in a complex pattern of interaction that, in these films at 
least, seem to reinforce the inscription of frontier dynamics in the texts. 
Moments of spectacle often occur on the frontier terrains that are visited. 
In Twister the spectacle, in the shape of the tornado, actually creates the 
frontier vortex amid more cultivated open spaces. Independence Day 
offers moments of spectacular engagement set in the landscape farther 
west, including an exhilarating chase that winds through the iconographic 
terrain of the Grand Canyon. It is in such a place that the alien can be 
taken on on a one-to-one basis and defeated by the skills of a pilot like 
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Hiller. The alternative form of spectacle in Independence Day, the 
destruction of the decadent metropolis, also serves to underpin the work 
of the narrative. The enjoyment of these scenes may include a simple 
wallowing in the spectacle of destruction, the safely bounded thrill of 
seeing hallowed monuments blasted to rubble, but this form of pleasure is 
integrated into the work of the narrative rather than offering merely 
arbitrary thrills. In these films spectacle seems often to work with 
narrative, rather than being disruptive.  
 
Spectacle is used here the way comic moments or musical 
numbers are used in the more „integrated‟ forms of comedy or the 
musical. Much work on the relationship between narrative and disruptive 
or spectacular elements has focused on the genres of comedy and the 
musical, two cases in which narrative seems most obviously to be subject 
to institutionalized disruption. Comic gags or self-standing comedian 
performances and musical numbers can disrupt narrative, particularly at 
the surface level of plot movement (although this does not guarantee any 
politically or ideologically disruptive effect10). But these moments can be a 
good deal more integrated. Comic or musical performances can be used 
to convey important story information and to drive the narrative forward. 
They can also work to underpin narrative oppositions and resolutions. In 
many comedian comedies, for example, the comic interruption may 
appear to disrupt story development but fits closely into underlying 
thematic oppositions such as those between childishness and maturity.11 
The big production number of the classical Hollywood musical might 
seem to intrude into plot development but often plays a key narrative role 
in asserting the reconciliation of opposites.12 Spectacle and narrative can 
work closely together. This is by no means always the case, and even 
where it is the degree of integration is variable. My argument is that a 
significant degree of interaction between the two is a characteristic of 
many popular products of contemporary Hollywood. To say this is not to 
revive a conception of the seamlessly coherent Hollywood text. The fact 
that spectacle and narrative act in concert in some ways does not prevent 
them continuing to obey their own logics and appeals in others. Neither 
 24 
dimension necessarily „contains‟ or „disrupts‟ the other. They operate 
together in a pattern that displays variable degrees of coherence from 
one example to another, or from one moment to another in the same film. 
 
 Spectacular cinema is sold largely on the basis of its sheer size 
and impact, its physical scale of image and multi-channel stereo 
sound its function specifically as „attraction‟. Gunning‟s use of the term 
is taken from the early writings of the Soviet filmmaker and theorist Sergei 
Eisenstein. For Eisenstein, attractions are „calculated to produce specific 
emotional shocks in the spectator‟ (34). They are designed to impact 
directly onto the viewer, physiologically and mentally. In Eisenstein‟s case 
the aim is make the viewer emotionally receptive to a propaganda 
message. In Hollywood, the ideological results may be equally potent, but 
are strictly secondary to the main intention, which is offer audiences a 
scale of audio-visual experience that will bring them back into the cinema. 
Spectacular cinema from the mid-1950s onwards has to be seen in the 
context of its contrast with television and other entertainments within the 
home. The low-level audio-visual impact of television and video is, 
literally, domesticated by both its small scale and its location among the 
routines of everyday life. 
 
Cinematic spectacle claims to provide something marked as 
distinct from this quotidian environment, something special, more intense 
and more filled with the large-scale illusion of presence. Big widescreen 
cinema claims to fill the viewer‟s vision. Multichannel hi-fi stereo 
sound taken up rather more slowly and reluctantly by exhibitors adds 
significantly to the impression of immersion in a three-dimensional 
experience. Viewers are assaulted by a brand of spectacle that might 
come down simply to sheer pace and kinetics; to loudness that can be felt 
bodily as vibration and brightness that makes the eyes contract. Special 
effects sometimes become little more than sequences of abstract audio-
visual „impact‟, the specific or detailed motivated realism of which may be 
largely coincidental. The viewer is sold the illusion of being transported 
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into the world on-screen, of experiencing more directly the moments 
which, in the films under consideration here, are those of the frontier or its 
analogues, moments of direct engagement for characters within the 
fiction. The point was made explicitly in advertisements of the 1950s 
which repeatedly depicted the widescreen spectator as inhabiting the 
same space as the on-screen action.13 As Mark Crispin Miller puts it: „Just 
as the theme park promises to take us right “into the movies” the movies 
now fake our integration with the spectacle […]‟ (235). For Miller, this 
„series of visceral jolts‟ is offered „instead of narrative‟. But, in these films 
at least, the visceral jolts offered to the viewer can also be read as a way 
of reinforcing narrative dynamics. The experience of watching such 
movies is sold as an stimulating intrusion into the everyday world of the 
viewer in a (perhaps rather pale) reflection of the way that the frontier 
experience on screen intrudes into the lives of the fictional characters.  
 
If the audience of Twister is comprised of thrill seekers, in search 
of better and more exciting spectacular effects, then so are its characters. 
For all the worthy alibi the attempt to increase scientific 
understanding the chasing of tornados is presented largely in terms of 
the whooping and the hollering and getting a buzz out of an exhilarating 
engagement with one of nature‟s spectacles. There is a distinct parallel 
between the on-screen relationship of chaser and tornado and that 
between viewer and cinematic spectacle. The response of the fictional 
characters to the ever-increasing spectacle of their real-world twisters is 
akin to that of the audience to the special effects version. In a similar way 
the giant alien spacecraft of Independence Day are as spectacular to 
those inside the movie as they are to the viewer in the theatre. Much is 
made of the awesome spectacle within the frame. The mere sight of the 
spacecraft reduces characters, both major and minor, to a state of 
gobsmacked, eye-popping and jaw-dropping daze, a state in which the 
experiences of the everyday world such as driving a vehicle without 
crashing into the one in front are eclipsed. A similar dynamic underlies 
the selling of the spectacle of the frame, the movie itself, which is 
 26 
promoted largely on the basis of effects designed to reduce the spectator 
to a similar state of awe and wonder in which ordinary life is left behind. 
The spectator is assaulted and at times overwhelmed. For Peter Biskind, 
this kind of filmmaking amounts to rendering the viewer passive and child-
like, a tendency of some of the films of George Lucas and Steven 
Spielberg especially. Whether the filmgoer is entirely disarmed remains 
open to question (and extremely difficult to ascertain), but Biskind‟s point 
remains an important one, particularly when the political or ideological 
implications of cinematic spectacle are concerned. Pounding forms of 
spectacle certainly seem to have a tendency to impose themselves 
forcefully on the viewer, to leave less space for contemplation or 
questioning. In this respect, spectacle can have an impact similar to that 
of driving linear narrative: it can in some cases reinforce, almost 
physiologically, whatever the narrative asserts.  
 
 The formal strategies of Twister chiefly involve an alternation 
between two kinds of photography, each of which seems designed to 
stress a different aspect of the frontier-type experience. In one 
movement, the film uses airy and exhilarating shots taken from a 
helicopter combined with an upbeat score to underline the freedom, 
mobility and space within which the heroes move as they race around the 
countryside, on and off-road, almost unbounded by any restraints. 
Alternatively, Twister turns to very tightly-framed action sequences, cut 
and panned rapidly and often using an unsteady camera to create the 
impression of being right there, in the action and participating in the 
sense of urgency and excitement. What all of this is supposed to offer is 
an illusion, of course, at both levels, in and outside the space of the 
narrative. As an experience analogous to that for which the frontier is 
made to stand, the experience of spectacular cinema may seem pitifully 
attenuated, and the comparison somewhat stretched. But it is 
questionable whether this promise of immediacy, intensity and presence 
is much more false and second-hand than any other mobilization of the 
myth, in contemporary Hollywood or elsewhere. Cinematic spectacle is 
 27 
clearly not the same as anything that the frontier might once have been. 
But it is sold on the promise of a similar structural relationship, 
supposedly offering an illusion of authenticity and sheer presence that 
can be opposed to the heavily mediated and circumscribed experiences 
of daily life. 
 
 If narrative offers order and coherence, moments of spectacle or 
excess may offer an alternative, the illusion of a more direct emotional 
and experiential impact. In the terms of the mythology, perhaps, narrative 
is the domain of „civilization‟ (organization, structure, routine) and 
spectacle that of the frontier (uncluttered engagement, presence). Like 
the mythology of the frontier, Hollywood cinema tends to offer a 
dialectical interchange between the two, an attempt to play on the appeal 
of each and to resolve some of their contradictory imperatives. To return 
to the level of Hollywood institutions, there may also be some 
approximate kind of match between two more or less historically 
paralleled pairs: the „classical‟ version of frontier mythology and the 
„classical‟ studio system, on the one hand, and new reassertions of 
frontier mythology and elements of the „new Hollywood‟ of the „post-
studio‟ era, on the other. The heyday of the studio system was a time 
when cinema was an institution central to American life, which would be 
expected to be more or less centrally located in terms of the materials of 
its movies, largely tending to reflect or help to mobilize dominant 
ideologies although not without the ambiguities likely to result from any 
attempt to produce popular cultural products that draw on a potentially 
disparate and sometimes contradictory range of popular discourses. The 
post-studio era began as one of change, of challenge to old industrial 
practices and values. It opened up new possibilities, in terms of both 
content and formal strategies, largely as a result of the loss of cinema‟s 
previously central role as a cultural institution. Frontier mythology came 
under question, as did the way Hollywood operated as an industry. New 
voices were allowed to some extent from counterculture to 
„blaxploitation‟ and the influence of European art cinema in an attempt 
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to find new audiences, especially under the threat of financial collapse 
that hit many of the major studios in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Classical Hollywood narrative style was among the practices to be 
questioned by some innovators.  
 
Older practices seem to have been asserted, however, at more 
than one level. The mythology of the frontier has been reasserted, along 
with classical  narrative form. So has the dominance of the majors. The 
legally-enforced removal of the major studios from the sphere of 
exhibition merely demonstrated the centrality of distribution, a sphere 
they continue to dominate. The central place of cinema itself has also 
been reasserted, to a significant extent, in relation to rival media such as 
television (in its expanding forms) and video. Television and video may be 
becoming more important in terms of the ultimate revenue earnings of 
movies, but cinematic exhibition remains the key marketplace, the 
location at which future values tend to be set for circulation in subsidiary 
channels. The centrality of spectacle or a narrative based on loud rhetoric 
has played an important part in something of a rebirth of the specifically 
cinematic experience in the 1980s and 1990s, in a move away from the 
more dismal shoe-box sized multiplex screen to a renewed emphasis on 
the quality of the audio-visual experience. This is the ideal, at least; it may 
not account for the less than fabulous quality of the experience still found 
in many theatres. 
 
 Some contradictory imperatives appear to be in play here. 
Products designed for the big screen and influenced by thoughts of 
suitability for exploitation as computer games or theme-park rides may 
not appear to sit so happily on the television screen (via broadcast or 
cassette). What kind of aesthetic most effectively bridges the gap? Mark 
Crispin Miller‟s answer is that Hollywood movies have come to look and 
sound like television commercials. The source of such a change, he 
suggests, can be found in the influence of product placement strategies 
and reciprocal movements of creative personnel between cinema and 
advertising. Contemporary Hollywood movies work „without, or against, 
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the potential depth and latitude of cinema, in favour of that systematic 
overemphasis deployed in advertising (and all other propaganda). Each 
shot presents a content closed and unified, like a fist, and makes the 
point right in your face: big gun, big car, nice ass, full moon, a chase 
(great shoes!), big crash (blood, glass), a lobby (doorman), sarcasm, 
drinks, a tonguey, pugilistic kiss (nice sheets!), and so on.‟ (205) This 
may be true of many films, but not all. It does not account very well for the 
more expansive visual style of Twister and Independence Day, even if 
they tend not to take advantage of the full potential of the widescreen 
frame.  Contemporary spectaculars tend to be framed in such a way that 
they can be reframed or scanned without causing damage noticeable to 
many viewers. (There can still be significant losses, however. The 
introductory shots of Bill and Melissa in Twister a head-on view through 
the windscreen of their pickup keeps them in separate shots, indicating 
subliminally the gap between them that the narrative will assert. The first 
time Bill and Jo occupy the cab they are included together in a single 
shot, underlining their essential kinship. A panned/scanned and re-edited 
version of the film erases this distinction entirely, breaking the latter shot 
into two and leaving no basis for assuming that the first shot is not also 
merely the result of changes made in the transition to small screen). It 
might be argued that some movies are designed for big-screen 
blockbuster appeal and others for smoother transition to television and 
video if it was not for the well-established fact that the biggest hits on 
both television and video are usually those which made a big splash in 
the cinema. The effects-led cinema blockbusters are the films that tend 
more than others to fill whole walls with copies in video rental outlets. 
Peter Kramer offers one of the more lucid explanations of this 
phenomenon: 
 
Big screen spectacles rely for their revenues on small screen 
media, and these in turn rely for their appeal on movies which, 
when replayed on domestic small screen media, carry with them 
the grandeur and mystique of cinema. The theatrical presentation 
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of expensively-made movies to paying audiences who willingly and 
wholeheartedly submit themselves to the power and excesses of 
big screen spectacles remains an important cultural experience 
which is able to infuse the more mundane and casual use of 
domestic technologies with special meaning. (12-13) 
 
New developments in domestic television and video technology may go 
some way towards narrowing the gap between the cinematic and small 
screen experience. Widescreen high-definition digital television and 
surround-sound systems including a version of the THX sound developed 
by George Lucas are sold with the promise of creating a „home cinema‟ 
effect. How widely these will be taken up remains to be seen. As primarily 
domestic media, television and video are consumed in ways often very 
different from the experience of cinema, allowing all sorts of distractions 
and other simultaneous activities. The difference is considerably more 
than one of technological fidelity, and the market for more „cinematic‟ 
home systems may be limited to certain niches only. The driving force 
behind such developments, anyway, has far less to do with questions of 
cinematic or television aesthetics than economic motivations the 
creation of new opportunities to sell into what have become relatively 
saturated hardware markets.  
 
 It is no small irony that the financial success of movies like Twister  
and Independence Day is due largely to the kind of dependence on „state-
of-the-art‟ technology that is questioned by the dominant strain of the 
narrative. The experience that stands in for that of the frontier is a product 
of the very system from which the narrative asserts the possibility of 
escape: technology, giant business oligolpoly, and so on. This is not an 
accident. Large-scale spectacular effects can be seen as an important 
part of the system that enables the Hollywood majors to retain 
oligopolistic control of the industry. At a time when new media 
technologies could potentially reduce some costs and increase access to 
filmmaking, they seem often to be used instead as part of Hollywood‟s 
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traditional strategy of maintaining or raising „barriers to entry‟. Despite 
periodic calls for cost-cutting and savings, it has generally suited the 
majors for the costs of production, distribution and marketing to remain 
high because this prevents anyone else from getting a foot in the door. 
The high salaries paid to stars since the „golden age‟ of the studio system 
perform much the same function. The sheer scale of investment required 
means that the only way to compete effectively in the long term is to own 
one of the existing majors. Once a certain level of special effects 
technology has been deployed by the majors it creates a demand that 
other films match the same expensive standard. Issues of „quality‟ and 
„standards‟ such as this have long acted as a cover for the enshrining of 
just one expensive, Hollywood way of operating, when others, which 
do not have access to the same promotional resources, might be equally 
valid.14 Competitors are often led to attempt to emulate Hollywood 
spectacle, without having the resources to do it properly, thereby 
seemingly proving the maxim that „nobody does it like Hollywood‟ a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  
 
Based to a significant extent on the success of a large number of 
small, independent houses, the state-of-the-art computer digital effects 
business might be held up as exemplifying a move in „post-studio-era‟ 
Hollywood towards a decentralized or „post-Fordist‟ production system. 
There has been a very clear move away from the Fordist mass 
production-line system that characterized the heyday of the studio era. 
This is another change that can easily be over-stated, however. For one 
thing, as Asu Askoy and Kevin Robins make clear, moves towards what 
post-Fordists term „flexible specialization‟ in the production process the 
general shift to an environment in which film packages are assembled on 
something closer to a one-off basis and in which the different elements of 
each package might be supplied by a large number of small 
providers has not been matched by any such decentralization at the 
crucial levels of finance and distribution.15  There have also been moves 
towards some re-centralization at the production and post-production 
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level. As far as digital effects is concerned, the majors have begun to take 
over: „To date, the studios have chosen either to buy established entities 
outright (Sony with Imageworks, Disney with Dream Quest); take 
substantial stakes (Fox with VI Effects, DreamWorks with PDI [Pacific 
Data Images]; or form their own in-house divisions (Warner Bros.).‟16 As 
ever, the majors are happy to leave the risks of innovation to outsiders 
(the same pattern was seen in the case of the development of sound in 
the 1920s and of widescreen processes in the 1950s), moving in to reap 
the benefits at a later stage when potential profitability has been 
demonstrated.  
 
Back to the frontier 
 
 The films considered here demonstrate the continued saliency of 
the particular narrative associated with frontier mythology—complete with 
its various complications and resolutions, its thematic concerns and blend 
of narrative and spectacle—in contemporary Hollywood cinema. The 
ideology of the Western was always riven by tensions—most notably 
those between the rival values of wilderness and civilization—which 
became increasingly explicit in the postwar period. The subsequent 
wholesale revisionism of Westerns of the Vietnam and immediate post-
Vietnam eras made sufficient inroads into the classical mythology 
substantially to reduce its acceptability to both industry and audiences. 
The Westerns of the last decades of the twentieth century tend to be one-
off affairs, often marketed as special or „event‟ movies, and frequently 
posing as „alternative‟ in ideological stance, rather than a central thread in 
the familiar Hollywood fabric.17 This is in keeping with a broad trend in the 
commercial American cinema since the break up of the vertically-
integrated studio system in the 1950s, but seems particularly clear in the 
case of the Western. The frontier mythology that animated the Western 
has been transposed to a number of alternative domains. The frontier lost 
to immediate cinematic experience has been reinscribed in a number of 
other generic frameworks and as an important point of reference in „non-
genre‟ cinema.  
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 A parallel might be drawn between the status of the Western at the 
end of the twentieth century and that of the frontier itself in the late 
nineteenth century. The apparent closing of the historical frontier, 
announced in 1893,  was greeted with fear and dismay, just as the 
demise of the generic Western—with its ideological effects—might be 
mourned by some today. But substitutions were quickly found in both 
cases. The loss of the actual historical referent in the nineteenth century 
has been seen by some commentators as reducing the importance of 
frontier themes to the American imagination.18 If anything, the opposite is 
the case. The loss of the actual frontier has been no bar to the 
maintenance of the mythology. It has left the mythology all the more free 
to be expanded and developed. The traditional concept of the frontier 
always was rooted in myth more than reality—although it was capable 
also of creating reality through the acting out of the myth. The passing of 
the historical experience from which frontier mythology was extrapolated 
has merely helped to remove from view some of the contradictions it 
contained from the start. Mythology tends to be strengthened rather than 
weakened as its immediate—or, rather, always imagined—relation to 
experience is reduced. The loss of the actual generic Western today has 
been equally little bar to the maintenance of frontier mythology in 
Hollywood cinema. It has, once more, enabled the mythology to be 
expanded, developed and reinforced, in some cases imposed with a force 
that would not be  possible within the original generic confines. To adopt 
Rick Altman‟s terminology, certain of the „semantic‟ elements of frontier 
mythology—the basic units of meaning—may have changed (as in the 
case of the Native American „Other‟ replaced in Independence Day by the 
alien) while others have been retained (open western landscapes, for 
example, as signifiers of frontier virtues). More significantly, the basic 
„syntax‟—the underlying structure of oppositions—remains intact. This is 
not to suggest an a-historical  reading of structured oppositions but to 
provide a framework within which both change and continuity can be 
charted within the mythic/ideological landscape. Continuity is more the 
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outcome of active ideological projections and interventions with their own 
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